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SUBCOMPLETE FORCING, TREES AND GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS
GUNTER FUCHS AND KAETHE MINDEN
Abstract. We investigate properties of trees of height ω1 and their preservation under subcom-
plete forcing. We show that subcomplete forcing cannot add a new branch to an ω1-tree. We
introduce fragments of subcompleteness which are preserved by subcomplete forcing, and use
these in order to show that certain strong forms of rigidity of Suslin trees are preserved by sub-
complete forcings. Finally, we explore under what circumstances subcomplete forcing preserves
Aronszajn trees of height and width ω1. We show that this is the case if CH fails, and if CH
holds, then this is the case iff the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom holds. Finally, we explore
the relationships between bounded forcing axioms, preservation of Aronszajn trees of height and
width ω1 and generic absoluteness of Σ11-statements over first order structures of size ω1, also for
other canonical classes of forcing.
1. Introduction
Much of the work in this paper is motivated by prior work of the first author in which it was
observed that the countably closed maximality principle (MP<ω1-closed(Hω2)) implies countably
closed-generic Σ12(Hω1)-absoluteness, defined in Section 4, see [2]. The point here is that countably
closed-genericΣ11(ω1)-absoluteness is provable in ZFC. In [13], the maximality principle for subcom-
plete forcing was considered, and the question arose whether it has the same consequence. Dually
to the situation with countably closed forcing, the underlying question is whether subcomplete
generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness is provable in ZFC. Subcomplete forcing was introduced by Jensen,
who showed that it cannot add real numbers, yet may change cofinalities to be countable, and that
it can be iterated with revised countable support. Moreover all countably closed forcing notions
are subcomplete. What makes forcing principles for subcomplete forcing particularly intriguing is
that they tend to be compatible with CH, while otherwise having consequences similar to those
of other, more familiar forcing classes, such as proper, semi-proper, or stationary set preserving
forcings, which imply the failure of CH. There is a close relationship between these generic ab-
soluteness properties and the preservation of certain types of Aronszajn trees, and this led us to
investigate properties of trees of height ω1 and their preservation under subcomplete forcing. The
main question we had in mind, stated in [13, Question 3.1.6], was whether subcomplete forcing can
add a branch to an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree, that is, a tree of height and width ω1 that does not
have a cofinal branch.
The work on properties of ω1-trees and their preservation under subcomplete forcing, in particu-
lar on strong forms of rigidity, led us to consider weak forms of subcompleteness which themselves
are preserved by subcomplete forcing. In Section 2, we recall the definition of subcompleteness,
originally introduced by Jensen, investigate the relevant fragments of subcompleteness we call min-
imal subcompleteness and prove the preservation facts we need. In Section 3, we show that Suslin
trees are preserved under minimally subcomplete forcing, and that such forcing cannot add new
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branches to ω1-trees. We then show that certain strong forms of rigidity of Suslin trees, introduced
in [6], are preserved by subcomplete forcing. Finally, in Section 4, we establish the relationships
between the preservation of wide Aronszajn trees, forms of generic absoluteness and the bounded
subcomplete forcing axiom, of course building on Bagaria’s work [1] on bounded forcing axioms and
principles of generic absoluteness. The main results in this section are as follows. The first one is
Theorem 4.21, which says:
Theorem. Assuming CH, the following are equivalent.
(1) Subcomplete generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
(2) BSCFA.
(3) Subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
Here, BSCFA is the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom. The corresponding equivalence holds
for any other natural class of forcing notions (see Definition 4.9) that don’t add reals. The second
main result is Theorem 4.22, which settles our original question, whether subcomplete forcing can
add a branch to an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree:
Theorem. Splitting in two cases, we have:
(1) If CH fails, then subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
(2) If CH holds, then subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees iff BSCFA holds.
We have a complete analysis for other forcing classes as well. The following is Theorem 4.24.
Theorem. Let Γ be the class of proper, semi-proper, stationary set preserving, ccc or subcomplete
forcing notions. Consider the following properties.
(1) BFAΓ.
(2) Γ-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
(3) Forcings in Γ preserve (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
Then (1)⇐⇒ (2) =⇒ (3), but (3) does not imply (1)/(2).
Of course, subcomplete forcing is the only one of these forcing classes whose bounded forcing
axiom is consistent with CH, and it is in the presence of CH that the unusual situation arises that
these conditions are equivalent for this class.
2. Fragments of subcompleteness and their preservation
We begin by recalling the concept of subcompleteness of a partial order, as introduced by Jensen
(see [10]). IfM and N are models of the same first order language, then we writeM ≺ N to express
that M is an elementary submodel of N , and we write σ : M ≺ N to say that σ is an elementary
embedding from M to N . If X is a subset of the domain of N , then we write X ≺ N to express
that the reduct N |X of N to X is an elementary submodel of N .
Definition 2.1. A transitive set N (usually a model of ZFC−) is full if there is an ordinal γ
such that Lγ(N) |= ZFC
− and N is regular in Lγ(N), meaning that if x ∈ N , f ∈ Lγ(N) and
f : x −→ N , then range(f) ∈ N .
Definition 2.2. For a poset P, δ(P) is the minimal cardinality of a dense subset of P.
Definition 2.3. Let N = LAτ = 〈Lτ [A],∈, A ∩ Lτ [A]〉 be a ZFC
− model where τ is a cardinal and
A is a set, δ an ordinal and X∪{δ} ⊆ N . Then CNδ (X) is the smallest Y ≺ N such that X∪δ ⊆ Y .
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Definition 2.4. A forcing P is subcomplete if there is a cardinal θ > δ = δ(P) which verifies
the subcompleteness of P, which means that P ∈ Hθ, and for any ZFC
− model N = LAτ with
θ < τ and Hθ ⊆ N , any σ : N ≺ N such that N is countable, transitive and full and such that
P, θ ∈ range(σ), any G ⊆ P which is P-generic over N , and any s ∈ range(σ), the following holds.
Letting σ(s, θ,P) = s, θ,P, there is a condition p ∈ P such that whenever G ⊆ P is P-generic over V
with p ∈ G, there is in V[G] a σ′ such that
(1) σ′ : N ≺ N ,
(2) σ′(s, θ,P) = s, θ,P,
(3) (σ′)“G ⊆ G,
(4) CNδ (range(σ
′)) = CNδ (range(σ)).
The three main properties of subcomplete forcings are that they don’t add reals, preserve sta-
tionary subsets of ω1, and that they can be iterated (with revised countable support). We now
isolate key parts of what it means that a forcing is subcomplete, which are in a sense responsible
for these preservation properties. The remaining parts are crucial for the iterability of the resulting
class of forcings. We call the stripped down version of the definition of subcompleteness minimal
subcompleteness.
Definition 2.5. If X is a set such that the restriction of ∈ to X orders X extensionally, then let
σX : NX −→ X be the inverse of the Mostowski collapse of X , where NX is transitive.
Let N be a transitive model of ZFC−, and let P ∈ X ≺ N , where X is countable. Then X
elevates to NP if the following holds: let c ∈ NX , and let P = σ−1X (P). Then, whenever G is generic
over NX for P, there is a condition p ∈ P such that if G is P-generic over V and p ∈ G, then in
V[G], there is an elementary embedding σ′ : NX ≺ N such that σ′“G ⊆ G and σ′(c) = σX(c).
A forcing notion P is minimally subcomplete if for all sets a, H , there is a transitive model of
ZFC
− the form N = LAτ with a ∈ N and H ⊆ N such that
ZN,P,a = {ω1 ∩X | a ∈ X and X elevates to N
P}
contains a club subset of ω1.
Let us first show that this is indeed a weakening of subcompleteness.
Observation 2.6. If P is subcomplete, then P is minimally subcomplete.
Proof. Let θ verify the subcompleteness of P. Given sets a, H let τ > θ, A ⊆ τ , andHθ ∈ N = Lτ [A]
with a ∈ N and H ⊆ N . Let µ = τ+ and ν = τ++. Let N ′ = Lµ[A]. We claim that ZN ′,P,a contains
a club. Let
Z = {ω1 ∩ Y | a ∈ Y ≺ Lν [A], Y countable}
Then clearly, Z contains a club. Moreover, if ω1 ∩ Y ∈ Z, where Y ≺ Lν [A] and Y is countable,
then, letting A = (σY )
−1(A), τ = (σY )
−1(τ) and µ = (σY )
−1(µ), it follows that NY is of the form
Lν [A], where A ⊆ τ , so A is a bounded subset of µ, which is regular, and also the largest cardinal in
NY . Letting N = Lµ[A], it follows that N is full, as witnessed by NY (note that NY has the same
bounded subsets of µ as N , and it is a model of ZFC−). Let σ = σY ↾N , X = range(σ) = Y ∩Lµ[A].
Then, since P is subcomplete, X elevates to N ′P. Since ω1 ∩ X = ω1 ∩ Y , it follows that ZN ′,P,a
contains a club, as claimed. 
Next, let’s check that minimal subcompleteness, while weaker than subcompleteness, is still
strong enough to preserve the properties mentioned before.
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Fact 2.7. Let P be a minimally subcomplete forcing, and let G ⊆ P be P-generic over V.
(1) P(ω)V = P(ω)V[G].
(2) If S is stationary in ω1, then this remains true in V[G].
Proof. For (1)., the proof is exactly the same as with subcomplete forcing. Assume the contrary,
and suppose toward a contradiction that there is name r˙ ∈ V P for a subset of ω and a condition
q forcing that r˙ is new. Let a = 〈q, r˙〉. By minimal subcompleteness, there is N with Hθ ⊆ N
for some large enough θ, so that ZN,P,a contains a club. So there is α = ω1 ∩ X ∈ ZN,P,a, where
X ≺ N is countable. Then X elevates to NP. Let G be a generic filter for σ−1X (P) = P over NX ,
such that σ−1X (q) = q ∈ G. So we have a condition p ∈ P, where, letting G be P-generic over V
containing p, we have an elementary embedding σ′ : NX −→ N such that σ′“G ⊆ G. Thus q ∈ G
as well, so we have that r = r˙G is new. But this is a contradiction as r = σ′“r = σX“r = r ∈ V ,
where r = σ−1X (r).
For (2)., assume the contrary. Let S ⊆ ω1 stationary, and suppose towards a contradiction that
there is a C˙ ∈ V P such that for some q ∈ P,
q  “C˙ ⊆ ωˇ1 is club ∧ Sˇ ∩ C˙ = ∅.”
Let a = 〈q, C˙, S〉, and, by minimal subcompleteness, let N be such that ZN,P,a contains a club,
where Hθ ⊆ N , for some θ which is sufficiently large to conclude that the fact displayed above holds
in N . Let α ∈ S ∩ZN,P,a, and let X witness this. That is, a ∈ X ≺ N , α = ω1 ∩X , and X elevates
to NP. Let a = σ−1X (a), P = σ
−1
X (P), and let c = 〈a,P〉.
Since σX : NX ≺ N is elementary, a is of the form 〈q, C˙, S〉, where σX(q) = q, σX(C˙) = C˙,
σX(S) = S, and in NX , q forces with respect to P that C˙ ⊆ αˇ is club.
Let G be P-generic over N with q ∈ G. Since X elevates to NP, there is a condition p ∈ P such
that if we let G be P-generic over V with p ∈ G, then there is in V[G] an elementary embedding
σ′ : N ≺ N with σ′(c) = σX(c) and σ′“G ⊆ G. So σ′ lifts to an embedding σ∗ : NX [G] ≺ N [G]
in V [G]. Let C = C˙
G
, C = C˙G. Since q = σ′(q) ∈ G, we have that C ⊆ ω1 is club in V[G] and
S ∩ C = ∅ in N [G]. However, α = ωN1 , so q ∈ G implies that C is club in α. Since σ
∗ ↾ α = id, it
follows that C ∩α = C ∩α, and so, α < ωV1 is a limit point of C, so α ∈ C ∩S, a contradiction. 
It was shown in [13] that the subcompleteness of a forcing P is very fragile: it can be destroyed
by countably closed forcing - note in this context that Jensen pointed out that every countably
closed forcing is subcomplete. The same negative result remains true of minimal subcompleteness.
In the following proposition, N denotes Namba forcing, which Jensen proved to be subcomplete,
assuming CH (see [10] and [11]).
Proposition 2.8 ([13]). Forcing with Coll (ω1, ω2)× N collapses ω1.
Thus, after forcing with Coll (ω1, ω2), the ground model version of Namba forcing collapses ω1,
hence adds a real, and is thus not even minimally subcomplete any longer (see Fact 2.7). However,
the minimal fragment of subcompleteness survives countably distributive forcing of size at most ω1,
as we shall show presently.
Lemma 2.9. Let P be subcomplete. Then after countably distributive forcing of size at most ω1, P
is minimally subcomplete.
Proof. Let Q be countably distributive, and let |Q| ≤ ω1. Let H ⊆ Q be generic. Let’s assume
that the conditions in Q are countable ordinals, so that H ⊆ ω1. To show that P is minimally
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subcomplete in V [H ], let a = a˙H , θ be given. In V[H ], we have to find a transitive N |= ZFC−
with Hθ ⊆ N , such that the set ZN,P,a contains a club subset of ω1.
In V, since P is subcomplete, we can pick a regular cardinal τ and an A ⊆ τ such that, letting
µ = τ+ and ν = τ++, we have that Hθ ⊆ Lτ [A], and whenever Y is countable, P ∈ Y and
Y ≺ Lν [A], it follows that X = Y ∩ Lµ[A] elevates to Lµ[A]
P, because in this situation, NX is full,
as in the proof of Observation 2.6.
In V[H ], let A′ = A ⊕ H = {≺α, β≻ | α ∈ A ∧ β ∈ H}, where ≺α, β≻ is the Go¨del code of
〈α, β〉. Note that Lτ [A′] = Lτ [A,H ] = Lτ [A][H ]. We claim that in V[H ], whenever Y ′ ≺ Lν[A′] is
countable, with P, A,A′,Q, H ∈ Y ′, it follows that X ′ = Y ′ ∩ Lµ[A′] elevates to Lµ[A′]
P.
To see this, fix such Y ′ and X ′, and let τ, µ,A,A
′
,Q, H be such that
σY ′(τ , µ,A,A
′
,Q, H) = τ, µ,A,A′,Q, H
Then NY ′ = Lν [A
′
], for some cardinal ν, and by elementarity of σY ′ , it follows that in NY ′ it is the
case that H is Q-generic over Lµ[A]. Let σ = σY ′ ↾Lµ[A]. So σ = σX , where X = X ′ ∩Lµ[A], and
σ : Lµ[A] ≺ Lµ[A] is elementary.
In V[H ], let G be P-generic over Lµ[A
′
], and let c ∈ NX′ be given. There is then a c˙ ∈ Lµ[A]
such that c = c˙H . Let Y = Y ′∩Lν [A], X = X ′∩Lµ[A]. Since Q is countably distributive, it follows
that G,X, Y ∈ V, and G is P-generic over Lµ[A]. Since X = Y ∩ Lµ[A], it follows that X elevates
(in V) to Lτ [A]
P, as NX is full. Hence, there is a condition p ∈ P that verifies this (with respect to
c˙). Thus, let G be P-generic over V[H ] with p ∈ G. Then in V[G], there is a σ′ : Lµ[A] ≺ Lµ[A]
with σ′“G ⊆ G and σ′(c˙) = σX(c˙). So σ′ lifts to σ∗ : Lµ[A][G] ≺ Lµ[A][G].
Since H ∈ Lµ[A
′
] and G is P-generic over Lµ[A
′
], it follows by the product lemma that H is
Q-generic over Lµ[A][G], and since σ∗ doesn’t move H , as H ⊆ ω
Lµ[A]
1 = ω
Lµ[A][G]
1 , it follows that
σ∗ lifts to
σ∗∗ : Lµ[A][G][H] ≺ Lµ[A][G][H ]
Noting that
Lµ[A][G][H ] = Lµ[A][H ][G] = Lµ[A
′
][G]
and
Lµ[A][G][H ] = Lµ[A][H ][G] = Lµ[A
′][G]
we see that σ∗∗ ↾ Lµ[A
′
] witnesses that X ′ elevates to Lµ[A
′]P in V[H ], since σ∗∗(c) = σ∗((˙c)H ) =
σ′(c˙H) = σ′(c˙)H = σX(c˙)
H = σX′(c). This last equality holds because σX = σX′ ↾ Lµ[A], since X
is transitive in X ′, in the sense that if d ∈ X and e ∈ d∩X ′, then e ∈ X . It follows that σX′ is the
lift of σX to Lµ[A
′
], and hence that σX(c˙)
H = σX′(c).
Thus, H
V[G]
θ ⊆ Lµ[A
′] and ZLµ[A′],P,a contains a club, because in V[H ], {Y
′ ∩ ω1 | Y ′ ≺ Lν [A′]}
contains a club. 
Remark 2.10. Slight variations of the proof of the previous lemma show the following.
(1) Minimal subcompleteness is preserved by countably distributive proper (that is, strongly
proper) forcing of size ω1. In a sense, the modified proof is somewhat easier than the
original one.
(2) The following slightly strengthened version of minimal subcompleteness of a forcing P, which
is still weaker than subcompleteness, is preserved by countably distributive forcing of size
ω1: for any set a, there is a τ and an A ⊆ τ , such that, letting µ = τ+ and ν = τ++, we
have that a,P ∈ Lµ[A], and for every countable Y ≺ Lν [A], Y ∩ Lµ[A] elevates to Lµ[A]P.
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To formulate a corollary to the previous lemma, recall that, given a cardinal µ, Jensen introduced
a version of subcompleteness called subcompleteness above µ, which requires the elevated embedding
to coincide with the originally given embedding up to the preimage of µ. There is a natural version
of minimal subcompleteness above µ, which we make precise presently.
Definition 2.11. Let µ be a cardinal, N a transitive model of ZFC−, P a forcing notion and X ≺ N
countable with µ,P ∈ X . Then X elevates to NP above µ if for every G which is generic over NX
for σ−1X (P), and for every c ∈ NX , there is a condition p ∈ P such that whenever G is generic over
V for P, then in V[G], there is an elementary σ′ : NX ≺ N with (σ′)“G ⊆ G, σ′(c) = σX(c) and
σ′ ↾ µ = σX ↾ µ, where µ = σ
−1
X (µ).
The proof of Lemma 2.9 then shows the following.
Corollary 2.12. Let P be subcomplete above µ. Then after countably distributive forcing of size at
most µ, P is minimally subcomplete above µ.
3. Minimal subcompleteness and the preservation of properties of ω1-trees
Countably closed forcing does not add cofinal branches through ω1-trees, so it is natural to
wonder whether other subcomplete forcing cannot do this either. Indeed, we see below that this is
true of minimally subcomplete forcing as well. The proof for subcomplete forcing is given in [13].
Let’s begin by establishing some terminology on trees.
Definition 3.1. A tree is a partial order T = 〈|T |, <T 〉 in which the predecessors of any member
of |T are well-ordered by <T and there is a unique minimal element called the root.
• The members of |T | are called the nodes of T , and we will tend to conflate the tree T with
its underlying set |T |.
• The height of a node t ∈ T is the order type of the set of its predecessors under the restriction
of the tree order. We write Tα for the αth level of T , the set of nodes having height α. The
height of a tree T , height(T ), is the strict supremum of the heights of its nodes.
• We write T ↾ α for the subtree of T of nodes having height less than α. An ω1-tree is a
normal tree of height ω1 where all levels are countable. A tree of height ω1 is normal if every
node has (at least) two immediate successors, nodes on limit levels are uniquely determined
by their sets of predecessors, and every node has successors on all higher levels up to ω1.
• We write Tt to denote the subtree of T consisting of the nodes s ∈ T with s ≥T t. For nodes
t ∈ T , by succT (t) we mean the set of successors s ≥T t in the tree.
• A branch b in T is a maximal linearly ordered subset of T , and the length of the branch is its
order type. For α less than the length of b, we write b(α) for the node in b that has height
α. We write [T ] for the set of cofinal branches of T , that is, those branches containing nodes
on every nonempty level of T . If t ∈ T is a node, then we write bt to mean the “branch”
below t: bt = {s ∈ T | s <T t}.
• An ω1-tree is an Aronszajn tree if it has no cofinal branches. Two nodes t and s in T are
compatible, written s ‖ t, if there is r ∈ T such that r ≥T t and r ≥T s. This is the same
as demanding that either s <T t, s >T t, or s = t, or, in other words, that s and t are
comparable. Otherwise, they are incompatible, written s ⊥ t. An antichain in a tree is a set
of pairwise incompatible elements. A Suslin tree is an ω1-tree with no uncountable antichain.
When forcing with a tree, we reverse the order, so that stronger conditions are higher up in
the tree. Consequently, Suslin trees are ccc as notions of forcing. A Kurepa tree is an ω1-tree
with at least ω2-many cofinal branches.
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Lemma 3.2. Let T be an ω1-tree. If P is minimally subcomplete and G is P-generic then [T ] =
[T ]V [G].
Proof. Assume not. Let b˙ be a name for a new cofinal branch through T ⊆ Hω1 ; let p ∈ P be a
condition forcing that b˙ is a new cofinal branch through Tˇ . Let N be a transitive model of ZFC−
with P, b˙, p ∈ N and Hθ ⊆ N , such that Z = ZN,P,〈b˙,p〉 contains a club, where θ is large enough
to ensure that inside N , p forces that b˙ is a new cofinal branch through Tˇ . Let α ∈ Z, and let X
witness this. Let α = ω1 ∩X , N = NX and σ = σX . As usual, let p,P, b˙ = σ−1(p,P, b˙).
By elementarity, we have that p forces b˙ to be a new cofinal branch over N . As we construct a
generic G for P over N , we will use the countability of N to diagonalize against all “branches” as
seen on level α of the tree T in N , thereby obtaining a contradiction.
Toward this end, enumerate the dense sets 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of P that belong to N . Also denote the
sequence of downward closures of nodes on level α of T , the “branches” through T ↾ α that extend
to have nodes of higher height in T , as 〈bn | n < ω〉. Now define a sequence of conditions of the
form pn for n < ω that decide values of b˙ in T differently from bn. Ensure along the way that for
all n,
• pn+1 ∈ Dn and
• pn+1 ≤ pn.
The construction (in V ) may go as follows:
Let p0 := p ∈ N . For each n < ω, note that there must be two conditions p
0
n+1 ⊥ p
1
n+1, both
extending pn, that decide the value of the branch b˙ to differ on some value. This always has to be
possible since these conditions always extend p, that forces b˙ to be new. Say p1n+1  xˇn ∈ b˙ and
p0n+1  xˇn /∈ b˙. Let pn+1 be a condition in Dn extending p
1
n+1 if xn /∈ bn, or a condition in Dn
extending p0n+1 otherwise.
Let G be the generic filter generated by the 〈pn | n < ω〉, let b˙
G
= b. Since P is minimally
subcomplete, there is a condition q ∈ P such that whenever G is P-generic with q ∈ G, by minimal
subcompleteness we have σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
So below q there is a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G] extending σ′ with σ∗(b) = σ′(b˙)G = b˙G = b, and
σ∗(T ) = σ′(T )G = T . The point is that since p ∈ G, we have N [G] |= p ∈ G, so b is a branch
through T .
Furthermore, α is the critical point of the embedding σ∗. So below α the tree T , and thus the
branch b, is fixed. In particular, in N [G], b ↾ α = b. However, b was constructed so as to not be
equal to any of the bns, so it cannot be extended to become a branch through T , since it can’t have
a node on the αth level. This is a contradiction. 
So in particular, minimally subcomplete forcing preserves Aronszajn trees. The following theorem
shows that after forcing with a minimally subcomplete forcing, not only are there no new cofinal
branches added to a Suslin tree T , but no uncountable antichains either. The proof is exactly the
same as is given by Jensen [9, Chapter 3 p. 10].
Lemma 3.3. Minimally subcomplete forcing preserves Suslin trees.
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Proof. Let T be a Suslin tree. Let P be minimally subcomplete. Suppose toward a contradiction
that p ∈ P forces that A˙ is a maximal antichain of size ω1. Let N be a transitive model of ZFC
−
with p,P, A˙ ∈ N , and with Hθ ⊆ N , where θ is large enough that N is sufficiently correct about
what p forces with respect to P, such that ZN,P,〈p,P,A˙〉 6= ∅. Let X ≺ N with p,P, A˙ ∈ X such that
X elevates to NP. Let σ = σX , N = NX .
Letting α = ωN1 , we have that T = T ↾α as usual. Let M be a countable, transitive ZFC
− model
with both N, T ↾ (α+ 1) ∈M . Let G ⊆ P be generic over M with p ∈ G. So G is also generic over
N .
We can now work below a condition in G ⊆ P generic to obtain a σ′ ∈ V [G] such that:
• σ′ : N ≺ N
• σ′(θ,P, T , p, A˙) = θ,P, T, p, A˙
• σ′“G ⊆ G.
As usual we have a lift σ∗ : N [G] ≺ N [G]. Letting A = A˙
G
and A˙G = A we have that σ∗(A) = A.
Let 〈bt | t ∈ Tα〉 be the collection of partial branches below the nodes of level α of the tree T .
Every node in T above level α has to have a predecessor in level α. For each t ∈ Tα, G is P-generic
over N [bt] since bt is T -generic over N - as cofinal branches through Suslin trees are generic. By
the product lemma, each bt is T -generic over N [G]. Since A is maximal, bt ∩ A 6= ∅. Thus A is
sealed in T = T ↾α, meaning it has no elements above level α. But since A ⊆ A and A is maximal,
this means that A is countable, so T remains Suslin as desired. 
The following rigidity properties were introduced in [6], where it was shown, among other things,
that Suslin trees exhibiting these properties can be constructed, assuming the ♦ principle holds.
Definition 3.4. A normal ω1-tree T has the unique branch property (is UBP) so long as
1 T “Tˇ has exactly one new cofinal branch.”
That is, after forcing with the tree, T has exactly one cofinal branch that was not in the ground
model. We say that T has the n-fold UBP so long as forcing with T n adds exactly n branches.
A Suslin tree is Suslin off the generic branch so long as after forcing with T to add a generic
branch b, for any node t not in b, the tree Tt remains Suslin. Let n be a natural number. A Suslin
tree T is n-fold Suslin off the generic branch so long as after forcing with with the tree n times, or
forcing with T n that adds n branches b1, . . . , bn, Tp remains Suslin for any p not on any bi.
Combining the results from Sections 2 and 3, we can conclude that these strong rigidity properties
of Suslin trees are preserved by subcomplete forcing.
Theorem 3.5. The following properties of an ω1-tree T are preserved by subcomplete forcing:
(1) T is Aronszajn
(2) T is not Kurepa
(3) T is Suslin
(4) T is Suslin and UBP
(5) T is Suslin off the generic branch
(6) T is n-fold Suslin off the generic branch (for n ≥ 2)
(7) T is (n− 1)-fold Suslin off the generic branch and n-fold UBP (for n ≥ 2)
Proof. Items (1). and (2). are immediate corollaries of Lemma 3.2. Item (3). is Lemma 3.3. In fact,
these properties are even preserved by minimally subcomplete forcing.
For the remaining proofs, let P be a subcomplete forcing, and let G be generic for P over V.
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Proof of (4). First we show upward absoluteness. Let T be a Suslin tree with the UBP. We have
already seen that T is still Suslin in V[G]. To see that it is still UBP, let b be T -generic over V[G].
In V [b], b is the unique cofinal branch through T , and we have that P is still minimally subcomplete
by Lemma 2.12. Since minimally subcomplete forcing doesn’t add branches to ω1-trees by Lemma
3.2, b is still the unique cofinal branch of T in V [b][G] = V [G][b]. So T still has the UBP in V [G].
For downward absoluteness, suppose T has the UBP in V [G] but does not have the UBP in V .
Let p ∈ G force that T has the UBP. Let b be a generic branch for T over V such that in V [b] the
tree T has at least two branches. Let G′ be P-generic over V[b] with p ∈ G′. Then T has at least
two branches in V[b][G′] = V[G′][b], so T is not UBP in V[G′], contradicting that p ∈ G′.
Proof of (5). For upward absoluteness, let T be Suslin off the generic branch, and let b be a generic
branch for T over V[G]. T is still Suslin in V [G] by (3). In V [b], we have that P is still minimally
subcomplete by Lemma 2.9. We have that for any node t not in b, the tree Tt remains Suslin in
V [b][G] = V [G][b] since after minimally subcomplete forcing Tt remains Suslin by Lemma 3.3. So
T remains Suslin off the generic branch after forcing with P.
For downward absoluteness, suppose T is Suslin off the generic branch in V [G] but not in V . Let
p ∈ G force that T is Suslin off the generic branch. Let b be a V-generic branch through T such
that in V [b] the tree T is not Suslin off the generic branch. So there is t ∈ T off of b such that Tt
is not Suslin in V[b]. Let G′ be P-generic over V[b] with p ∈ G′. Then, in V [b][G′] = V[G′][b], Tt is
not Suslin, so that T is not Suslin off the generic branch in V[G′], contradicting that p ∈ G′.
Proof of (6). For upward absoluteness, let T be n-fold Suslin off the generic branch. Let b1 × b2 ×
. . .×bn be T
n-generic over V[G]. Since T is n-fold Suslin off the generic branch, it follows that T n is
countably distributive, so again we know that P is still minimally subcomplete in V[b1, b2, . . . , bn] by
Lemma 2.9. In V [b1, . . . , bn][G] = V [G][b1, . . . , bn], for any node t not in one of the generic branches
b1, . . . , bn, we have that Tt is Suslin by Lemma 3.3. So T remains n-fold Suslin off the generic branch
after forcing with P. Downward absoluteness works as in (5).
Proof of (7). For upward absoluteness, suppose that T is (n− 1)-fold Suslin off the generic branch
and n-fold UBP for some n ≥ 1. Let b1 × b2 × . . . × bn be T n-generic over V[G]. Since T is
(n − 1)-fold Suslin off the generic branch, it follows that T n is countably distributive, so again
we know that P is still minimally subcomplete in V[b1, b2, . . . , bn] by Lemma 2.9. Again we have
V [b1, . . . , bn][G] = V [G][b1, . . . , bn] where b1, . . . , bn are the unique cofinal branches through T , since
P does not add branches to T n over V [b1, . . . , bn]. So T has the n-fold UBP in V [G]. We have
already seen in (6). that T stays (n− 1)-fold Suslin off the generic branch in V[G].
Downward absoluteness is again the same as in (4). 
4. Generic absoluteness and the preservation of wide Aronszajn trees
In Lemma 3.2, we showed that subcomplete forcing cannot add a new branch to an ω1-tree,
and in particular, that it preserves Aronszajn trees. In the present section, we will explore slightly
stronger preservation properties. Let us introduce versions of κ-trees in which the requirement that
the levels have size less than κ is relaxed.
Definition 4.1. Let κ and λ be cardinals. We shall say that T is a (κ,≤λ)-tree if T is a tree of
height κ with levels of size less than or equal to λ. We shall refer to the size restriction on the levels
in the tree in the second coordinate as the tree’s width, so that a (κ,≤λ)-tree has width ≤ λ.
An Aronszajn (κ,≤λ)-tree is a (κ,≤λ)-tree with no cofinal branch.
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It is easy to see that in general, countably closed forcing can’t add a (cofinal) branch to any
(ω1,≤κ)-Aronszajn tree, for any κ. The guiding question for the work in the present section, as
stated in [13], is as follows.
Question 4.2. Can subcomplete forcing add cofinal branches to an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree?
In the remainder of the present section, we will answer this question fully. Let’s first make the
simple observation that even countably closed forcing may add branches to a tree of height ω1 and
width ≤2ω (but such a tree can never be Aronszajn, by our earlier remarks).
Observation 4.3. Subcomplete (or even countably closed) forcing may add a cofinal branch to an
(ω1,≤2ω)-tree.
Proof. The point here is that the poset Add (ω1, 1) is subcomplete since it is countably closed, but
it may be viewed as a tree of height ω1 that has levels of size up to 2
ω. Of course this tree is not
Aronszajn - it is Kurepa. Every cofinal branch through the tree corresponds to a subset of ω1, of
which there are already more than ω1-many of in the ground model. 
If we allow the size of the levels of the height ω1 tree to be large, then we can obtain a slightly
more complicated example of an Aronszajn tree to which subcomplete forcing can add a cofinal
branch, using the forcing denoted by Jensen as PA. In the following definition, we write cof(ω) for
the class of ordinals with countable cofinality.
Definition 4.4. Let κ > ω1 be regular, and let A ⊆ κ∩ cof(ω). We write PA to denote the forcing
designed to shoot a cofinal, normal sequence of order type ω1 through A. The conditions of PA
consist of normal functions of the form p : ν + 1 → A, where ν < ω1, and extension is defined in
the usual way, by p ≤ q if and only if q ⊆ p.
Jensen showed that PA is subcomplete, see [10]. If (κ ∩ cof(ω)) \ A is stationary in κ ∩ cof(ω),
then PA is not countably closed. A PA-generic filter G gives rise to the function ∪G : ω1 → A which
is normal and cofinal in κ. The forcing PA is used to show that the subcomplete forcing axiom
SCFA implies Friedman’s Principle, which states that for every regular cardinal κ > ω1 and every
stationary set A ⊆ κ ∩ cof(ω), there is a normal function f : ω1 → A, that is, A contains a closed
set of order type ω1.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that Friedman’s Principle fails for ω2. Then subcomplete forcing may
add a cofinal branch to an (ω1,≤ω2 · 2ω)-Aronszajn tree.
Proof. Let A ⊆ cof(ω) ∩ ω2 witness the failure of Friedman’s Principle. Consider the forcing poset
PA as a tree. It has size ω1 · ωω2 = ω
ω
2 , since it consists of functions with domain in ω1, and each
condition is from a countable ordinal to ω2.
Considering PA as a tree, it has height ω1. Each level has size less than or equal to ωω2 = ω2 · 2
ω.
Moreover, since Friedman’s Principle fails for ω2, the tree PA has no cofinal branches and is thus
Aronszajn, yet forcing with the tree will add a cofinal branch. 
However, we may slightly tweak the proof of Lemma 3.2 to see that subcomplete forcing does
preserve (ω1, <2
ω)-Aronszajn trees. Note that this shows that the failure of CH implies a negative
answer to Question 4.2.
Theorem 4.6. Subcomplete forcing cannot add (cofinal) branches to (ω1, <2
ω)-trees.
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Proof. Assume not. Let b˙ be a name for a new branch through T ⊆ Hω1 an (ω1, < 2
ω)-tree; let p
be a condition forcing that b˙ is a new cofinal branch through Tˇ . Let θ verify the subcompleteness
of P and let’s place ourselves in the standard setup:
• P ∈ Hθ ⊆ N = Lτ [A] |= ZFC
− where τ > θ and A ⊆ τ
• σ : N ∼= X 4 N where X is countable and N is full.
• σ(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙.
Let α = ωN1 , the critical point of the embedding σ. By elementarity, we have that p forces b˙ to be
a new branch over N . We will construct continuum-many generics Gr for P over N , indexed by
reals, each of which will correspond to continuum-many different values of the generic branch on
level α of the tree T in N , to obtain a contradiction.
Toward this end, enumerate the dense sets 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of P that belong to N , so that p ∈ D0.
We would like to construct binary trees of conditions in P and branches in T : P = 〈px | x ∈ 2
<ω〉,
B = 〈bx | x ∈ 2<ω〉 such that, letting |x| be the length of x, we have the following:
• px ∈ D|x|
• x ⊆ y =⇒ py ≤ px ≤ p
• for some β > |x|, px  b˙ ↾ βˇ = bx
• bx⌢〈0〉 6= bx⌢〈1〉.
To do this, let p0 := p ∈ N . As we noted in the proof of Lemma 3.2, there must be two conditions
q01 ⊥ q
1
1, both extending p0, that decide the value of the branch b˙ differently. This always has to be
true since these conditions extend p, that forces that there is a new cofinal branch b˙. In particular,
by our reasoning there is β < ω1, and two conditions q
0
1 ≤ p0 and q
1
1 ≤ p0 such that
q01  b˙(β) = t
0 and q11  b˙(β) = t
1,
where t0 6= t1. Let b〈0〉 be the branch in T below t
0 and b〈1〉 be the branch in T below t
1. It must
be that b〈0〉 6= b〈1〉. Moreover we may extend q
0
1 and q
1
1 to conditions p〈0〉, p〈1〉 ∈ D1.
Continuing in such a fashion, we may recursively continue to define px for x ∈ 2
<ω.
In particular, suppose px and bx are defined for x of length n. By our reasoning above there is
β > |x|, and two conditions above each px, such that q
0
x ≤ px and q
1
x ≤ px so that
q0x  b˙(β) = t
0 and q1x  b˙(β) = t
1,
where t0 6= t1. Let bx⌢〈0〉 be the branch in T below t
0 and bx⌢〈1〉 be the branch in T below t
1.
Extending each of these incompatible conditions so as to land in the (n + 1)th dense set, we find
px⌢〈0〉 ≤ q
0
x and px⌢〈1〉 ≤ q
1
x such that px⌢〈0〉, px⌢〈1〉 ∈ Dn+1. Then, as desired, for each x of
length n we have that px⌢〈0〉, px⌢〈1〉 ∈ Dn+1. We’ve also designed it so that px⌢〈1〉 ≤ px ≤ p and
px⌢〈0〉 ≤ px ≤ p. Since we know that there is some m
′ such that px  b˙ ↾m
′ = bx we know that
px⌢〈1〉 and px⌢〈0〉 force the same thing since they both extend px. Thus our construction gives us
that px⌢〈0〉  b˙ ↾m = bx⌢〈0〉 and px⌢〈1〉  b˙ ↾m
′ = bx.
So we have our binary trees P and B as desired. Any chain of conditions in the binary tree P
will generate a generic filter Gr; every real r : ω → 2 codes a path in the binary tree of conditions
generating the generic. This is because our conditions were chosen to meet all of the dense sets in
our list. Moreover, each generic filter Gr corresponds to a branch br, where for each initial segment
12 FUCHS AND MINDEN
t of r satisfies that for some β > |x|, br ↾m = bx. Because of how we chose P , this gives us that
N [G] |= b˙
G
= br.
For each r let b˙
Gr
= br. Since P is subcomplete, for each r there is a condition qr ∈ P such that
whenever G is P-generic with qr ∈ G, by subcompleteness we have σr ∈ V [G] such that:
• σr : N ≺ N
• σr(θ,P, T , p, b˙) = θ,P, T, p, b˙
• σr“Gr ⊆ G.
So below each qr there is a lift σ
∗
r : N [Gr] ≺ N [G] extending σr with σ
∗
r (br) = σr(b˙)
G = b˙G = br,
and σ∗r (T ) = σr(T )
G = T .
This means that we may force over N with P to obtain continuum many cofinal branches through
the tree, 〈br | r ∈ 2
ω〉. Each of these branches must, of course, have a node on level α. Since each
cofinal branch br is unique, and since α is the critical point, this means that there are 2
ω-many
nodes on level α of the tree T in N , a contradiction. 
Note that Proposition 4.5 shows that if CH fails, then the previous theorem is optimal, that is,
it cannot be extended to (ω1,≤2ω)-trees.
Next, we will look at the preservation of wide Aronszajn trees from a different angle, and show
that under CH, dropping the restriction to trees with countable levels amounts to making a state-
ment about a certain form of generic absoluteness which we introduce in the following.
Definition 4.7. Let n be a natural number, let P be a notion of forcing, and let κ be a cardinal.
Then P-generic Σ1n(κ)-absoluteness is the statement that for any model M = 〈M, ~A〉 of size κ for
a countable first order language and every Σ1n-sentence ϕ over the language of M , the following
holds:
(M |= ϕ)V ⇐⇒ 1P P (M |= ϕ)
Note that we don’t distinguish between the first and second order satisfaction symbol.
For a forcing class Γ, Γ-generic Σ1n(κ)-absoluteness is the statement that P-generic Σ
1
n(κ)-
absoluteness holds for every P ∈ Γ. The classes of interest to us are the classes of ccc, proper,
semi-proper, stationary set preserving or subcomplete forcings.
We will mostly be interested in Σ11(κ)-absoluteness. Note that by upward absoluteness, Σ
1
1(κ)-
absoluteness for a forcing notion P can be equivalently expressed by saying that forM as in the above
definition and a Σ11-formula ϕ, ifM |= ϕ holds in every forcing extension by P, thenM |= ϕ holds in
V. It is a ZFC fact that countably-closed Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness holds, and more generally, <κ-closed
Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds, for regular κ, see [2]. Much is known about the case κ = ω. For example,
by Shoenfield absoluteness, P-generic Σ12(ω)-generic absoluteness holds for any forcing notion P.
Here, we will mostly be interested in the case κ = ω1. The following lemma gives an equivalent
characterization under CH for forcing notions which do not add reals, in terms of preserving wide
Aronszajn trees.
Lemma 4.8. Assume CH. Let P be a forcing notion. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) Whenever T is an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree, then it is not the case that 1P forces that Tˇ has
a cofinal branch, and it is not the case that 1P P“there is a new real”.
(2) P-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness holds.
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Proof. The direction (2) =⇒ (1) is clear: if Σ11(ω1)-statements are absolute for P, then it cannot
be that 1P forces that a real is added, because otherwise, by CH, one could use a predicate A ⊆ ω1
which lists all reals, and the Σ11-statement “there is a subset a of ω which is not listed in A” would
hold in any forcing extension by P, but not in V. Similarly, let T be an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree.
It cannot be that 1P forces that Tˇ has a cofinal branch, because otherwise the Σ
1
1 statement “Tˇ
has a cofinal branch” would be true in VP but not in V - the nodes of T can be assumed to be
countable ordinals, and the tree ordering can be used as a binary predicate to express this.
Let’s prove (1) =⇒ (2). Since we are assuming CH, we have that for any (ω1,≤2ω)-tree T , it is
not the case that 1P forces that Tˇ has a cofinal branch. Upward absoluteness between V and V
P
clearly holds for Σ11-statements. To show downward absoluteness, let
~A be a finite list of finitary
predicates on ω1, ~A ∈ V .
Let ψ( ~A) be the following statement:
∃X (ω1, ~A,X) |= ϕ
where ϕ is a first order sentence in the language of set theory with predicate symbols for ~A and X .
Assume that ψ( ~A) is true in V P. Let X˙ be a P-name such that 1P forces that X˙ is a witness that
ψ( ~ˇA) holds.
In V, let T be the tree consisting of nodes of the form (α, x) such that x ⊆ α, α < ω1 and
(α, ~A ↾ α, x) |= ϕ(a), where ~A ↾ α is the list whose elements are of the form Ai ∩ αmi , mi being the
arity of Ai. The tree ordering ≤ is defined by setting
(α, x) ≤ (β, y) ⇐⇒ (α, ~A ↾ α, x) ≺ (β, ~A ↾ β, y).
Notice that T has cardinality ω1 in V, by CH.
Now, if G is an arbitrary filter P-generic over V, then by a standard Lo¨wenheim-Skolem style
argument, applied in V[G], the set
C =
{
α < ω1 | (α, ~A ↾ α, X˙
G ∩ α) ≺ (ω1, ~A, X˙
G)
}
is club in ω1. Thus the set
{
(α, X˙G ∩ α) | α ∈ C
}
defines a cofinal branch through T in V [G], since
for all countable α, we have X˙G ∩ α ∈ V as P doesn’t add reals.
Since this works for any G, and since we assumed that for any (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree, it is not
the case that 1P forces that it has a cofinal branch, it follows that T is not an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn
tree. Hence, T has a cofinal branch in V , call it b. Let
X ′ =
⋃
{x | ∃α < ω1 (α, x) ∈ b}
Since (ω1, ~A,X
′) is the union of an elementary chain of models satisfying ϕ, this model must also
satisfy ϕ in V , and thus ψ( ~A) holds in V as witnessed by X ′. 
The formulation of condition 1. in the previous lemma seems a little cumbersome, and there is
a clearer variant of the lemma, using a slightly modified version of Σ11(κ)-absoluteness, which we
define presently.
Definition 4.9. Let P be a poset and κ a cardinal. Then strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness is
the principle asserting that for any model M = 〈M, ~A〉 of size κ for a countable first order language
and any Σ11-sentence ϕ over that language, whenever G ⊆ P is generic over V, then M |= ϕ iff
(M |= ϕ)V[G]. Similarly, if Γ is a forcing class, then strong Γ-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness says that
strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds for every P ∈ Γ.
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If P and Q are notions of forcing, then we say that P and Q are forcing equivalent if they
produce the same forcing extensions, that is, for every P-generic G, there is a Q-generic H such
that V[G] = V[H ] and vice versa.
Let us also introduce the notation P≤p for the restriction of the ordering of P to the set of
conditions q ≤ p. Call a forcing class Γ natural if whenever P ∈ Γ and p ∈ P, then P≤p is forcing
equivalent to some Q ∈ Γ.
In other words, using Σ11-upward absoluteness, for a modelM as above and a Σ
1
1 sentence over the
language of M , strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness says that for any P-generic G, if (M |= ϕ)
V[G]
holds, then M |= ϕ holds. Regular P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness, on the other hand, says that if for
every P-generic G, (M |= ϕ)V[G] holds, then M |= ϕ holds. To clarify the difference, let’s consider
the class Γ of all forcing notions P such that P is ccc and P has an atom. Then Γ-generic Σ11(κ)
always holds, because for P ∈ Γ and M , ϕ as before, if (M |= ϕ)V[G] holds for every P-generic G,
then it holds for some G that contains an atom, in which case V[G] = V, and thus, M |= ϕ. On
the other hand, strong Γ-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness implies that every Aronszajn tree is special,
because for an Aronszajn tree T , we can consider the lottery sum of a ccc forcing notion specializing
T and a trivial forcing, consisting of one atom. That forcing notion is in Γ. Let G be generic for the
nontrivial part of the forcing. If we let M be an elementary submodel of Hω1 of size ω1, equipped
with T as a predicate, then the existence of a function specializing T can be expressed as a Σ11
sentence over M , and it holds in V[G], hence in V, which means that T is special in V.
It is easy to see that the notion of forcing equivalence introduced in the previous definition is
first order expressible. Clearly, if P and Q are forcing equivalent, then (strong) P-generic Σ11(κ)-
absoluteness is equivalent to (strong) Q-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness. The following is essentially a
reformulation of [7, Corollary 3.11].
Fact 4.10. The class of subcomplete forcing notions is natural.
Proof. If P is subcomplete and p ∈ P, then by [7, Corollary 3.11], P≤p is δ(P)-subcomplete (in the
sense of [5]). This means that P≤p is essentially subcomplete in the sense of [5, Definition 2.2], and
[5, Observation 2.4] then implies that P≤p is forcing equivalent to a subcomplete forcing. 
Let us make a simple observation relating strong absoluteness to the previously introduced version
of absoluteness.
Observation 4.11. Let κ be a cardinal, let P be a forcing notion, and let Γ be a forcing class.
(1) Strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness is equivalent to saying that {P≤p | p ∈ P}-generic
Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds.
(2) If Γ is natural, then strong Γ-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness is equivalent to Γ-generic Σ
1
1(κ)-
absoluteness.
(3) If Γ is either the class of all c.c.c., proper, semi-proper, countably closed, stationary set
preserving or subcomplete forcing notions, then Γ is natural, and hence strong Γ-generic
Σ11(κ)-absoluteness is equivalent to Γ-generic Σ
1
1(κ)-absoluteness.
Proof. For (1), assume that strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds, let M be a κ-sized model
of a countable first order language, let ϕ be a Σ11-sentence of in that language, and let p ∈ P be a
condition. Assume that 1P≤p forces (with respect to P≤p) that M |= ϕ. If G ∋ p is P-generic, then
in V[G], it is the case that M |= ϕ. Thus, by strong P-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness, it is true in V
that M |= ϕ. This shows that {P≤p | p ∈ P}-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds.
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For the converse, assume that {P≤p | p ∈ P}-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds, let M and ϕ be
as before, let G be P-generic over V, and assume that in V[G], it is the case that M |= ϕ. There is
then a condition p ∈ G which forces that M |= ϕ. But then it follows that 1P≤p forces that M |= ϕ.
Hence, by P≤p-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness, it follows that M |= ϕ holds in V.
Now (2) and (3) follow immediately from (1), using Fact 4.10 and the remark preceding this
fact. 
All of this could be done for Γ-generic Σ1n-absoluteness as well, of course, but we will not need
this generality here. We obtain the following version of the previous lemma.
Lemma 4.12. Assume CH. Let P be a forcing notion. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) P preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees and does not add reals.
(2) Strong P-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness holds.
There is a natural version of the second order absoluteness properties introduced where one
talks about a certain canonical structure M , defined by a formula to be re-interpreted in V[G]. For
example, let’s define P-generic Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness to mean
(〈Hω1 , ~A〉 |= ϕ)
V ⇐⇒ (〈Hω1 , ~A〉 |= ϕ)
V P
for any finite set of finitary predicates ~A and any Σ11-sentence ϕ, where Hω1 is re-interpreted in V
P
on the right hand side, rather than working with the same model on both sides. To be clear, the
statement on the right hand side of the displayed equivalence means that 1P forces that 〈Hω1 , ~A〉,
in the sense of the forcing extension, satisfies ϕ. Further, Γ-generic Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness means
that this holds for every P ∈ Γ.
It turns out that Γ-generic Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness is equivalent to Γ-generic Σ
1
1(κ)-absoluteness,
where κ = 2ω, if Γ is a natural forcing class. Here, and in the following, we will indicate second
order quantification by upper case variables. To see the claimed equivalence, first suppose Γ-generic
Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness holds. It follows that Hω1 = H
V[G]
ω1 whenever G is generic for some P ∈ Γ.
Clearly, Hω1 ⊆ H
VP
ω1
, for any P. But if we had HVω1 $ M
V[G], then we could take A = HVω1 , and in
V[G] it would be true that 〈H
V[G]
ω1 , A〉 |= ∃x ¬A˙(x), but clearly this is not true in V. So it follows
that Γ-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness also holds, because H
V
ω1
has size κ and doesn’t change by forcing
in Γ.
To see the converse, assume that Γ-generic Σ11(κ)-absoluteness holds. We claim that it follows
that Hω1 = H
V[G]
ω1 whenever G is generic for some P ∈ Γ. Suppose otherwise. Then Hω1 $ H
V[G]
ω1
for some G generic for some P ∈ Γ, which means that V[G] has a new real. But then, in V[G], the
second order formula ∃X ⊆ ω ∀x x 6= X , holds in the structure 〈HVω1 ,∈〉, while this is not true
in V. Thus, it follows that Γ-generic Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness holds.
Remark 4.13. In the Lemmas 4.8 and 4.12, Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness can be replaced with Σ
1
1(Hω1)-
absoluteness, since under CH, Hω1 has size ω1. On the other hand, if CH fails, then Add (ω1, 1)-
generic Σ11(Hω1)-absoluteness fails, even though Add (ω1, 1), being countably closed, preserves
Aronszajn trees of any width. This is because Add (ω1, 1) forces CH, and this can be expressed
as a Σ11(Hω1) statement true in V
Add (ω1,1) but false in V.
We will now explore a fruitful connection between subcomplete generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness and
the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom.
The bounded forcing axiom was originally introduced in [8] in the context of proper forcing. The
bounded forcing axiom for a poset P says that if B is the complete Boolean algebra of P, then for
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any collection of up to ω1 many maximal antichains in B, each having size at most ω1, there is a
filter in B that meets each antichain. The bounded forcing axiom for a class Γ of forcings says that
each P ∈ Γ satisfies the bounded forcing axiom for P. We write BSCFA for the bounded forcing
axiom for the class of all subcomplete forcings. The following is a version of a characterization of
the bounded forcing axiom, due to Bagaria, tailored to the present context.
Theorem 4.14 ([1, Theorem 5]). Let P be a forcing notion. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) The bounded forcing axiom holds for P.
(2) P-generic Σ1(Hω2)-absoluteness holds, meaning: if ϕ(~x) is a Σ1-formula in the language of
set theory and ~a ∈ Hω2 , then ϕ(~a) iff P ϕ(~a).
A very useful way of reformulating this theorem is as follows.
Theorem 4.15. Let P be a forcing notion. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) The strong bounded forcing axiom holds for P, meaning that the bounded forcing axiom holds
for {P≤p | p ∈ P}.
(2) Strong P-generic Σ1(Hω2)-absoluteness holds: if G is P-generic over V, then
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σ1 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G].
Of course, in the previous theorem, Hω2 is reinterpreted in V[G] on the right hand side of (2)..
Thus, (2). of Theorem 4.15 can be taken as a characterization of the bounded forcing axiom for a
natural forcing class Γ.
We will show next that property (2). is equivalent to P-generic (or strong P-generic in the case
of Theorem 4.15) Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness. For this, we will need an observation that is probably a
folklore fact, but since it is important in the present context, we will provide a proof. We will work
with the following natural way of coding elements of Hω2 .
Definition 4.16. A code is a pair 〈R,α〉, where R ⊂ ω1 × ω1, α < ω1 and 〈ω1, R〉 is extensional
and well-founded.
If 〈R,α〉 is a code, then let UR, σR be the unique objects (given by Mostowski’s isomorphism
theorem) such that UR is transitive and σR : 〈UR,∈ ↾ UR〉 −→ 〈ω1, R〉 is an isomorphism. The set
coded by 〈R,α〉 is
cR,α = σ
−1
R (α).
Clearly, every member of Hω2 has a code, and only members of Hω2 have codes. Using codes,
Σ1 statements over 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 can be translated into Σ
1
1 statements over 〈Hω1 ,∈〉.
Observation 4.17. Let ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) be a Σ1-formula. Then there is a Σ
1
1-formula ϕ
c with free
variables X0, x0 . . . , Xn−1, xn−1 (upper case variables being second order and lower case ones being
first order) such that the following holds. Let a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ Hω2 , and let 〈R0, α0〉, . . . , 〈Rn−1, αn−1〉
be codes, such that ai is coded by 〈Ri, αi〉, for i < n. Then
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) ⇐⇒ 〈Lω1 ,∈〉 |= ϕ
c(R0, α0, . . . , Rn−1, αn−1).
Proof. The construction of ϕc proceeds by induction on ϕ. We will assume that ϕ is presented in
such a way that the only subformulas of ϕ that are negated are atomic. Any formula can be written
in this form.
If ϕ is of the form v0 = v1, then ϕ
c(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined in such a way that it expresses: there
is an injective function F : ω1 −→ ω1 with F (x0) = x1, such that whenever β0X0β1 . . . X0βmX0x0,
then F (β0)X1F (β1) . . . X1F (βm)R1x1 and vice versa. Expressing the existence of such a function
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requires a second order existential quantification. Hence, the resulting formula ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1)
can be written as a Σ11 formula.
If ϕ is of the form v0 ∈ v1, then ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined to express: there is a β < ω1 such
that βX1x1, and such that the sentence of the form (v0 = v1)
c holds of X0, x0, X1, β (reducing
to the previous case). The second order existential quantification occurring in (v0 = v1)
c can be
pushed in front of the first order quantification (“there exists a β < ω1”), in this case simply because
both are existential quantifications.
If ϕ is of the form ¬(v0 = v1), then ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined to express: there are U0, U1, F
such that U0 is closed under X0-predecessors, U1 is closed under X1-predecessors and F : 〈U0, X0 ∩
U20 〉 −→ 〈U1, X1 ∩U
2
1 〉 is a maximal isomorphism, meaning that F cannot be expanded beyond U0,
and it is not the case that x0 ∈ U0, x1 ∈ U1 and F (x0) = x1.
If ϕ is of the form ¬(v0 ∈ v1), then this can be expressed equivalently by ∀v ∈ v1¬(v0 = v). We
already know how to translate ¬(v0 = v), and we can then use the definition in the case of bounded
quantification below.
The inductive steps corresponding to the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ can be dealt with in the
obvious way, setting (ϕ ∧ ψ)c = ϕc ∧ ψc and (ϕ ∨ ψ)c = ϕc ∨ ψc.
Let’s look at the case that ϕ is of the form ∀u ∈ w ψ(u,w, v0, . . . , vn−1). Define the for-
mula ϕc(Y, y,X0, x0, . . . , Xn−1, xn−1) to express: for all βY y, ψ(u,w, v0, . . . , vn−1)
c is true of
Y, β, Y, y,X0, x0, . . . , Xn−1, xn−1. The resulting formula has a universal first order quantification
over a Σ11 formula. Since ω1-sequences of subsets of ω1 can be coded by single subsets of ω1, the
second order quantification can be pulled out in front of the first order quantifier, resulting in a Σ11
formula.
The case of existential bounded quantification is easier, so we omit it here.
Thus, we have described how to translate Σ0-formulas. The remaining case is that ϕ is of the
form ∃u ψ(u, v0, . . . , vn−1), where ψ(u, v0, . . . , vn−1) is a Σ0-formula. In this case, the translated
formula ϕc(X0, x0, . . . , Xn−1, xn−1) expresses that there are an S (this is second order) and an α
such that 〈S, α〉 is a code and such that ψc(S, α,X0, x0 . . . , Xn−1, xn−1) holds. Expressing that
〈S, α〉 is a code amounts to saying that it is extensional, which is first order expressible, and that
it is well-founded. In order to do this, we use an additional existential second order quantification,
saying that there is an F ⊆ ω1 × ω1 × ω1 such that, if we set fξ = {〈γ, δ〉 | 〈ξ, γ, δ〉 ∈ F}, then
fξ : 〈ξ, S ∩ (ξ × ξ)〉 −→ 〈ω1, <〉 is an order preserving function, for every ξ < ω1. This can be
expressed in a first order way, using the predicates S and F inside Lω1 , and it follows that S is well-
founded, because any decreasing ω-sequence in S would be bounded by some ξ < ω1, contradicting
that fξ is order preserving. And if S is well-founded, then so is every initial segment 〈ξ, S∩ (ξ×ξ)〉,
hence there is an fξ as described. 
Note that the proof of the previous observation contained a concrete translation procedure ϕ 7→
ϕc which ZFC-provably has the properties described, that is, the same translation procedure works
in any ZFC-model. Note also that we could have used any other model of (a fairly weak fragment
of) ZFC− that contains ω1 in place of Lω1 . We will use this uniformity of the translation procedure
in the following proof.
Observation 4.18. Let P be a notion of forcing that preserves ω1. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
(1) P-generic Σ1(Hω2)-absoluteness holds.
(2) P-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness holds.
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Proof. The implication (1) =⇒ (2) is easy to see, because P(ω1) ⊆ Hω2 , so a second order existential
quantification over ω1 can be expressed as a first order existential quantification over the elements
of Hω2 which are subsets of ω1.
For the direction (2) =⇒ (1), let ~a = a0, . . . , an−1 be a list of parameters in Hω2 , ϕ(~x) a Σ1-
formula, and suppose that
〈HV[G]ω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(~a)
whenever G is P-generic over V. In V, let 〈R0, α0〉, . . . , 〈Rn−1, αn−1〉 be codes for a0, . . . , an−1,
respectively, and let ϕc be the Σ11 translation of ϕ given by Observation 4.17. Since the same codes
work in V[G], the translation procedure is uniform, we can conclude that
(Lω1 |= ϕ
c(R0, α0, . . . , Rn−1, αn−1))
V[G].
Clearly, ϕc can be replaced by a Σ11-sentence ϕ˜
c in the language with predicate/constant symbols
C˙0, c˙0, . . . , C˙n−1, c˙n−1 for the codes, so that we get
(〈Lω1 ,∈, R0, α0 . . . , Rn−1, αn−1〉 |= ϕ˜
c)V[G]
Since this model is in V, and it has size ω1 there, noting that this holds for every P-generic G, it
follows from Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness that
〈Lω1 ,∈, R0, α0, . . . , Rn−1, αn−1〉 |= ϕ˜
c
holds in V, that is,
〈Lω1 ,∈〉 |= ϕ
c(R0, α0, . . . , Rn−1, αn−1)
holds in V, which means that, undoing the translation, which is uniform, we get that
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(~a)
as desired. 
The same proof shows the equivalence of the strong forms of these generic absoluteness conditions.
Note that either condition (1) or (2) of the following observation implies that P preserves ω1.
Observation 4.19. Let P be a notion of forcing. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Whenever G is generic for P over V, we have that
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σ1 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G].
(2) Strong P-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness holds.
Note that either 1. or 2. in the previous observation imply that P preserves ω1.
In general, we have the following simple observation.
Observation 4.20. Let Γ be a natural class of forcing notions, and consider the following state-
ments.
(1) BFAΓ.
(2) Γ-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
(3) Forcings in Γ preserve (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
Then (1)⇐⇒ (2) =⇒ (3).
Proof. (1) ⇐⇒ (2) follows from Observations 4.11.(2), 4.19 and Theorem 4.15. The implication
(2) =⇒ (3) follows because if T were an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree that acquires a cofinal branch in
V[G], where G is P-generic for some P ∈ Γ, then the existence of such a branch would be a Σ11(T )
statement true in V[G] but false in V, contradicting (2). 
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So, writing BSCFA for the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom, we get the following equivalences,
using the fact that the class of subcomplete forcing notions is natural (see Observation 4.11), as
well as Theorem 4.15, Lemma 4.12 and Observation 4.18.
Theorem 4.21. Assuming CH, the following are equivalent.
(1) BSCFA.
(2) Subcomplete generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
(3) Subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
Actually, (1) and (2) are equivalent, regardless of whether CH holds or not, and (1)/(2) always
implies (3), but for the converse, we need CH, since the failure of CH implies (3) (by Theorem 4.6),
but not (1)/(2).
Obviously, this theorem generalizes to any natural class Γ of forcing notions that don’t add reals.
Let us make some remarks on the consistency strength of BSCFA and its relationship to CH. It
was shown in [3] that the consistency strength of BSCFA is a reflecting cardinal. Moreover, looking
at the construction there, one sees that the consistency strengths of BSCFA and of BSCFA + CH
are the same. Namely, if BSCFA holds, then κ = ω2 is reflecting in L, and one can perform a
subcomplete (in the sense of L) forcing over L to reach a model L[g] where ω2 = κ. Since the
forcing is subcomplete in L, it does not add reals, and hence preserves CH. In a sense, in the
context of BSCFA, it is natural to assume CH, since it holds in the “natural” models, and since CH
is implied by natural strengthenings of BSCFA, such as the resurrection axiom or the maximality
principle for subcomplete forcing, see [13], [4].
However, BSCFA does not imply CH, and in fact, the first author, in joint work with Corey
Switzer, observed that the consistency strength of BSCFA + ¬CH is equal to that of BSCFA, that
is, the existence of a reflecting cardinal. Thus, assuming ¬CH, condition 3. in the previous theorem
holds, while the consistency strength of the equivalent conditions 1. and 2. is a reflecting cardinal,
showing that the implication cannot be reversed.
This puts us in a position to answer Question 4.2, asking whether subcomplete forcing may add
a cofinal branch to an (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree, completely. Recall Theorem 4.6, which gives us
part 1. of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.22. Splitting in two cases, we have:
(1) If CH fails, then subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
(2) If CH holds, then subcomplete forcing preserves (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees iff BSCFA holds.
It is now interesting to explore the relationships between bounded forcing axioms, the forms
of generic Σ11-absoluteness introduced above, and the property of (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree preser-
vation for other canonical classes of forcing. Let’s first observe some limitations on Γ-generic
Σ11(κ)-absoluteness.
Observation 4.23. (1) If CH fails, then Add (ω1, 1)-generic Σ11(ω2)-absoluteness fails.
(2) Col(ω1, ω2)-generic Σ
1
1(ω2)-absoluteness fails.
(3) If P is a forcing that adds a real, then P-generic Σ11(2
ω)-absoluteness fails.
Proof. For (1), if CH fails, we can takeM to be an elementary submodel ofHω1 of size ω2, containing
ω2 many distinct reals. If G is generic for Add (ω1, 1) over V, then in V[G], M satisfies the Σ11
statement that there is a function F with domain ω1 that lists all the reals of M , but it is false in
V.
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For (2), we can take M to be the structure ω2, equipped with an ordinal pairing function and a
constant symbol for ω1. Then if G is Col(ω1, ω2)-generic over V, in V[G], the structure M satisfies
the Σ11 sentence expressing that there is a surjection F from ω1 onto the universe of M . This is not
true in V.
For (3), if P adds a real, then the Σ11-formula “there is an X ⊆ ω such that for all x, x 6= X”
holds, from the point of view of VP, in the structure 〈HVω1 ,∈〉, but not from the point of view of
V. 
So, by (2) of the above observation, if Γ is the class of proper, semi-proper or stationary set
preserving, subcomplete, or countably closed forcings, then Γ-generic Σ11(ω2)-absoluteness fails.
Theorem 4.24. Let Γ be the class of proper, semi-proper, stationary set preserving, ccc or sub-
complete forcing notions. Consider the following properties.
(1) BFAΓ.
(2) Γ-generic Σ11(ω1)-absoluteness.
(3) Forcings in Γ preserve (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees.
Then (1)⇐⇒ (2) =⇒ (3), but (3) does not imply (1)/(2).
Proof. By Observation 4.20, we know that (1)⇐⇒ (2) =⇒ (3) holds. Let’s show that (3) does not
imply (2).
In the case of subcomplete forcing, we have already seen that (3) follows from ¬CH, while (1)/(2)
have consistency strength a reflecting cardinal.
For the case of ccc forcing, recall that is known that CH is consistent with the statement that
every Aronszajn tree is special, see [12]. But if every Aronszajn tree is special, then ccc forcing
cannot add a cofinal branch to any (ω1,≤κ)-Aronszajn tree T , no matter how wide it is: assume
P were a c.c.c. forcing that did. Let b˙ be a P-name for a cofinal branch through T , and let p ∈ P
force this. Let X be the set of members x of T such that some q ≤ p forces that xˇ ∈ b˙. Then X is
closed under T -predecessors, because if x ≤ y ∈ X and q ≤ p forces that yˇ ∈ b˙, then q also forces
that xˇ ∈ b˙. Also, the set X has nodes at arbitrarily large heights less than ω1, since p forces that b˙
is a cofinal branch. Moreover, for any α < ω1, X has at most countably many nodes at level α of
T , because for any such node, there is a condition below p that forces that that node is in b˙, and
these conditions have to be pairwise incompatible, so that the claim follows from the fact that P
is c.c.c. This shows that the restriction T of T to X is an ω1-tree, hence an Aronszajn tree, and
hence special. Now we have a contradiction, since P≤p adds a branch to T . This is impossible,
since P preserves ω1. But now, in any model of CH in which every Aronszajn tree is special, (3) is
satisfied, while (1) and (2) fail, since (1)/(2) imply the failure of CH.
To cover the remaining cases, we will show that if Γ is a natural forcing class containing all proper
forcing notions, then the assertion that forcing notions in Γ preserve (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn trees does
not imply BFAΓ. To see this, recall that it follows from MAω1 that every (ω1,≤ω1)-Aronszajn tree
is special, and hence that every such tree is preserved by every ω1-preserving forcing. But the
consistency strength of MAω1 is the same as that of ZFC, while the consistency strength of BFAΓ is
at least a reflecting cardinal. 
Recall that under CH, the versions of the three conditions listed in the previous theorem for
subcomplete forcing are equivalent. The proof showed that this is not the case for c.c.c. forcing (for
(3) is consistent with CH, in this case, while (1) is not). Of course, subcomplete forcing is the only
class considered here whose bounded forcing axiom is consistent with CH, and it is in the context
of CH that we have this unusual equivalence between the three conditions.
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